

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 181005 TOSEC 080220

63

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66613

DRAFTED BY: S/S:FVORTIZ

APPROVED BY: S/S:ORTIZ

----- 026033

O 312035Z JUL 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 181005 TOSEC 080220

NODIS

CHEROKEE

FOLLOWING REPEATS CAIRO 7519 ACTION DEPT JULY 31

QUOTE

S E C R E T CAIRO 7519

NODIS/CHEROKEE

DEPT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR EG US IS

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SADAT

SUMMARY: MET WITH FAHMY AND SEPARATELY, WITH SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN ALEXANDRIA TODAY TO PRESENT POINTS IN TALKING PAPER. SINCE RECENT ISRAELI STATEMENTS HAD GIVEN RISE HERE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS, FAHMY ADVISED I STRESS OUR BELIEF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. I DID SO. RESULTS OF MEETINGS WERE GENERALLY GOOD. SADAT FULLY ACCEPTED SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL PROPOSALS RE THE VARIOUS LINES. RE PASSES, HE AND FAHMY STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF ISRAELIS BEING OUT AND LIKED OUR PROPOSAL TO SEND SOMEONE TO MAKE AN OBJECTIVE DETERMINATION.

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 181005 TOSEC 080220

SADAT AGREED THAT, IN THIS ROUND, HE SHOULD INSIST UPON US MANNING OF UMM KHUSHAIB STATION, AND THAT HE WILL DURING SHUTTLE EFFORT ACCEPT ISRAELI MANNING WITH AMERICAN CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT AS EGYPTIAN CONCESSION. THIS SHOULD BE IN RETURN FOR THE

TWO WARNING STATIONS THAT EGYPTIANS WANT ON COASTAL AND ISMAILIA ROADS. HE IS UNABLE RPT UNABLE TO ACCEPT ISRAELI MANNING OF HAMAN FAROUN STATION, BUT IS AGREEABLE TO US CIVILIAN OR UN MANNING. HE ACCEPTS YOUR IDEAS ON THE ACCESS CORRIDOR AND ALSO AGREES TO JOINT USE OF THE TWO ROADS AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE PENDING SITING AND BUILDING A NEW PARALLEL ROAD. USE ON ALTERNATE DAYS IS AGREEABLE TO HIM, PROVIDED HE IS ASSURED THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO ISRAELI CHECKPOINTS. UN CHECKPOINT ACCEPTABLE. MODALITIES CAN BE WORKED OUT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS SPECIFIC QUERY, I ASSURED HIM THAT PRESIDENT FORD ENDORSES YOUR SUGGESTIONS. IN CONCLUSION, SADAT INDICATED HIS DESIRE TO MOVE RAPIDLY AND OFFERED SEND ME BY PRESIDENTIAL MYSTERE AIRCRAFT TO BUCHAREST AUGUST 2 IF THIS WILL HELP EXPEDITE PROCESS. HE ALSO OFFERED MAKE MYSTERE AVAILABLE FOR BELGRADE TRIP, IF THIS IS PREFERABLE. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR WISHES. END SUMMARY

1. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM MEETINGS IN ALEXANDRIA, FIRST WITH FAHMY ALONE AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES. BOTH MEETINGS WENT VERY WELL. IN EACH CASE, I MADE PRESENTATION OUTLINED IN THE TALKING PAPER YOU APPROVED AS MODIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT TELEGRAMS. RATHER THAN DETAIL PRESENTATION, I WILL SUMMARIZE SALIENT POINTS OF THE TWO MEETINGS BELOW:

2. MEETING WITH FAHMY: FAHMY, WHO RECEIVED ME AT HIS BEACH CABIN IN MONTAZA, SEEMED RELAXED AND EXPECTANT. I MENTIONED YOU HAD INDICATED THAT YOU WANTED ME TO SPEAK TO HIM FIRST IN ORDER TO SOLICIT HIS VIEWS ON VARIOUS POINTS. FAHMY IMMEDIATELY ASKED ABOUT THE PASSES. I TOLD HIM THAT, SINCE THE ISRAELIS SAY THEY ARE OUT OF THE GIDI AND MITLA PASSES, WE PROPOSE TO SEND SOMEONE TO DETERMINE OBJECTIVELY IF THEY ARE IN FACT OUT. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS AN EXCELLENT IDEA. HE OPINED THAT, FROM SADAT'S POINT OF VIEW, IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO HAVE THE ISRAELIS OUT OF THE PASSES. IT MAKES NO RPT NO DIFFERENCE IF THEY ARE A COUPLE OF HUNDRED METERS OUT OR A KILOMETER, JUST SO THEY ARE OUT. ON THE OTHER POINTS, FAHMY OPPOSED THE SUGGESTION THAT THE ISRAELIS MAN THE HAMAM FAROUN MONITORING STATION. THIS, HE SAID, SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 181005 TOSEC 080220

IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR SADAT TO ACCEPT. "WE CANNOT HAVE THE ISRAELIS AMONG US IN THAT AREA," WAS THE WAY HE PUT IT. THE HAMAM FAROUN STATION SHOULD BE US MANNED. HE ALSO REITERATED THE DIFFICULTIES SADAT WOULD HAVE WITH THE US MILITARY POSTS. WE EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY OF AMERICANS BEING IN THE UMM KHUSHAIB STATION AND PERHAPS IN THE PROPOSED MILITARY POSTS UNDER SOME KIND OF UNTSO UMBRELLA. FAHMY THOUGHT THIS WAS POSSIBLE, BUT NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD THEN ALSO EXPECT TO BE IN. SO FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, THIS GAVE HIM NO RPT NO PROBLEM, SINCE HE FELT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS THE FEELING THAT THEY ARE PARTICIPATING. HE WAS SURE, HOWEVER, THAT NEITHER THE US NOR ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO SOVIETS BEING INVOLVED. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SEE HOW IN ANY UNTSO TYPE ARRANGEMENT

SOME KIND OF SOVIET PARTICIPATION COULD BE AVOIDED, HE UNDERTOOK TO THINK MORE ABOUT IT AND GIVE US ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS THAT MAY ACCUR TO HIM.

3. FAHMY THEN ARRANGED THAT THE TWO OF US GO TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AT MAMURA. BEFORE WE LEFT, HE STRESSED THAT I SHOULD TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT YOU BELIEVE THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE AND THAT I DO SO AT THE VERY OUTSET TO KEEP THE MEETING ON THE UPBEAT. THIS WAS DESIRABLE, HE STATED, SINCE THE ISRAELIS HAVE OBVIOUSLY ALTERED THEIR POSITION VERY MUCH AND RECENT ISRAELI STATEMENTS HAVE RAISED SOME DOUBTS AS TO THEIR INTENTIONS. I AGREED TO DO SO.

4. MEETING WITH SADAT: IN ADDITION TO FAHMY, SADAT HAD WITH HIM VICE PRESIDENT MOBAREK, PRIMIN SALEM AND GAMASY. ALL LISTENED INTENTLY TO MY PRESENTATION. FOLLOWING AHMY'S ADVICE, I FIRST STATED THAT, DESPITE ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL WAS "SUBSTANTIALLY UNACCEPTABLE," THEY WANT TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IT REMAINS YOUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. PRESIDENT FORD AND YOU ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ONE AND YOUR SUGGESTIONS ARE INTENDED TO PERMIT RAPID PROGRESS. THIS HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON SADAT. I THEN WENT THROUG THE POINTS IN THE TALKING PAPER BUT AVOIDED BEING TOO PRECISE. SADAT'S COMMENTS THEREON FOLLOW:

A. LINES: THE PRESIDENT FULLY ACCEPTED THE SEVERAL LINES YOU SUGGEST AS WELL AS YOUR PROPOSED TACTICS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 181005 TOSEC 080220

THE EGYPTIAN FALLBACK PROPOSAL TO MOVE THEIR MAIN FRCES EAST OF THE CANAL HAD BEEN FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES AND THAT HE HAD NOT EXPECTED TI TO BE SALEABLE. I REMINDED HIM PROPOSAL HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN PRESENTED TO ISRAELIS.

B. PASSES: LIKE FAHMY, SADAT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISRAELIS BEING OUT OF THE PASSES. IF WHAT THEY SAY IS TRUE, HE NOTED, THERE SHOULD BE NO RPT NO PROBLEM. HOWEVER, THEIR MAP SHOWS OTHERWISE AND SOME OF THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUGGEST THAT THEY STELL PROPOSE TO BE TWO OR THREE KILOMETERS IN THE PASSES. HE LIKED THE IDEA OF AN AMERICAN EXPERT BEING SENT TO DETERMINE OBJECTIVELY WHERE THE EASTERN PASS ENTRANCES ARE.

C. MONITORING STATIONS: ON THE UMM KHUSHAIB STATION, HE AGREED TO INSIST IN THIS ROUND ON US MANNING, KNOWING THAT HE CANNOT GET SAME. HE IS PREPARED , IN THE LATER STATES OF THE SHUTTLE EFFORT, TO AGREE TO ISRAELI MANNING WITH US CIVILIAN ADMINSTRATION IN RETURN FOR THE TWO EGYPTIAN WARNING STATIONS ON THE COASTAL AND ISMAILIA ROADS. HE WAS PLEASED THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT THESE TWO WARNING STATIONS. (GAMASY INDICATED THAT THESE TWO WARNING STATIONS SHOULD HAVE RADAR.) HE DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT AN EGYPTIAN STATION NEAR THE MITLA PASS.

HOWEVER, SADAT SAID HE COULD NOT RPT NOT AGREE TO ISRAELI MANNING OF THE HAMAM FAROUN STATION. HE ECHOED FAHMY'S WORDS THAT THE EGYPTIANS CANNOT HAVE THE ISRAELIS LIVING AMONG THEM. INSTEAD, THE PROPOSED HAMAM FAROUN STATION SHOULD BE ENTIRELY MANNED AND ADMINISTERED BY US CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. FAHMY INTERJECTED THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO REASON WHY THIS SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS. UNLIKE THE UMM KHUSHAIB STATION, THERE IS NO RPT NO PRESENT STATION AT HAMAM FAROUN; HENCE OPERATING ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE DEVELOPED FROM SCRATCH WITHOUT ANYONE HAVING TO LEAVE. ALTERNATIVELY, UN MANNING AND ADMINISTRATION IS ACCEPTABLE.

D. US MILITARY POSTS: PURSUANT SECTO 046, I HAD SOFTENED THE TALKING PAPER ON THE PROPOSED SIX US MILITARY POSTS. I TOLD SADAT THE ISRAELIS REMAIN VERY INTERESTED IN HAVING SIX SUCH POSTS. WHILE THE PRESIDENT COULD OF COURSE REFUSE THEM, THEY COULD BECOME SOMEWHAT OF A STICKING POINT, ALTHOUGH YOU DO NOT CONSIDER THEM A BREAK-OFF ISSUE. WE COULD DISCUSS THESE LATER ON. SADAT'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT HE COULD NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT US MILITARY
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 181005 TOSEC 080220

POSTS. HE REITERATED HIS EARLIER POINT THAT, HAVING EXPELLED THE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS, HE COULD NOT RPT NOT NOW BRING IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY WITHOUT INCURRING CRITICISM AT HOME, FROM OTHER ARABS AND FROM THE SOVIETS. I POINTED OUT THAT THE TWO PROPOSED POSTS IN THE GIDI AREA COULD BE REPRESENTED AS AN EXTENSION OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE AT UMM KHUSHAIB AND SERVE AS A USEFUL CHECKPOINT TO ENSURE THAT THE ISRAELIS GOING TO UMM KHUSHAIB ARE NOT ARMED. HE LIKED THAT IDEA. I ALSO MENTIONED YOUR BELIEF THAT THE SIX MIGHT BE REDUCED BY TWO. GAMASY WANTED TO KNOW WHICH TWO. I SAID THIS WAS A MATTER THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED. I TRIED TO ASCERTAIN IF THE PRESIDENT HAS A FEASIBLE FALLBACK POSITION ON THESE POSTS, INDICATING THAT THIS COULD BE SOLELY FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND WOULD NOT BE PASSED TO THE ISRAELIS. HE WAS EQUIVOCAL IN HIS REPLY. IN PRINCIPLE HE OPPOSES THE CONCEPT OF US MILITARY POSTS, BUT I GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT IF THEY COULD BE SET UP UNDER SOME KIND OF AN UMBRELLA (SUCH AS UNTSO) HE MIGHT ACQUIESCE. HE SAID HE WOULD WANT TO THINK ABOUT THIS A BIT MORE AND AGREED THAT THE MATTER MIGHT BE DISCUSSED LATER.

E. ACCESS CORRIDOR: SADAT AGREED TO ACCEPT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL ON THE SOUTHERN END. HE ALSO AGREED TO THE HAMAM FAROUN SECTOR BEING UNDER THE UN WITH ONLY NOMINAL EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION. THIS, HE SAID, WE CAN WORK OUT IN SOME WAY.

F. SOUTHERN ROADS: AFTER I HAD GONE THROUGH MY POINTS ON THE SOUTHERN ROADS, POINTING OUT THE PRACTICAL, TECHNICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED, SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES HELD ABOUT A TEN-MINUTE DISCUSSION AMONG THEMSELVES ON THE SUBJECT. SADAT ULTIMATELY SAID HE AGREES WITH OUR PROPOSAL TO HAVE US EXPERTS PARTICIPATE WITH THE ISRAELIS IN A TECHNICAL SURVEY TO FIND A PLACE FOR ANOTHER

ROAD. IN THE MEANTIME, THE PRESENT ROAD COULD BE JOINTLY USED. THIS, HE EMPHASIZED, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A NEW ROAD HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED. ADDITIONALLY, HE EMPHASIZED THERE MUST BE NO RPT NO ISRAELI CHECKPOINTS ON THE ROAD, ALTHOUGH A UN CHECKPOINT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO HIM. I AGAIN ASSURED HIM THAT HE WILL HAVE OUR FULL SUPPORT TO INSURE THAT EVENTS OF THE SUEZ ROAD WILL NOT RPT NOT BE REPEATED AND THAT WE HAVE AN ASSURANCE FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY WILL NOT RPT NOT STOP OR INVESTIGATE EGYPTIAN TRUCKS. SADAT INDICATED HE WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES OF HANDLING THE ROAD.

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 181005 TOSEC 080220

5. AT THE END OF MY PRESENTATION, I OUTLINED FOR SADAT THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES WE DISCUSSED, E.E. A) EGYPTIANS WOULD BE BROUGHT FORWARD SOME TEN KILOMETERS FROM THEIR PASSES OR SO, B) THE ISRAELIS WOULD WITHDRAW SOME 30-40 KILOMETERS, C) THERE WOULD BE UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO THE OILFIELDS, D) THE OILFIELDS WOULD BE RETURNED TO EGYPT. SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES SEEMED PLEASED. HE ASKED IF PRESIDENT FORD ALSO SUPPRTS THIS PROPOSAL. I TOLD HIM I HAD MET BRIEFLY WITH THE PRESIDENT IN BONN, THAT I KNEW YOU HAD DISCUSSED THE WHOLE MATTER WITH HIM A DAY OR SO EARLIER, AND THAT SADAT COULD BE SURE THAT PRESIDENT FORD IS BEHIND WHAT YOU ARE SUGGESTING TO HIM AND SUPPORTS IT. THI -) 9 0)3- 3\$ #8.. HE REITERATED THAT HE WOULD HONOR THE COMMITMENTS HE HAD MADE TO PRESIDENT FORD AND TO YOU AT SALZBURG AND ASWAN.

6. IN CONCLUDING, I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT WE ENVISAGE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AS A KIND OF HOLDING OPERATION TO ALLOW TIME TO PREPARE TO MOVE TOWARD AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL SOME TIME IN 1977. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO CONSULT WITH THE ISRAELIS BEFORE PUTTING FORTH ANY PROPOSAL, WE WILL MAKE OUR COMMITMENT AMBIGUOUS. FAHMY INTERJECTED THAT WE SHOULD ALSO GIVE SADAT A COMMITMENT TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL IN 1977. I SAID I WAS AUTHORIZED TO REITERATE TO HIM THAT, IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE MOST PROPITIOUS TIME TO BEGIN TO PUSH FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT IS 1977, I.E. AFTER OUR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. SADAT READILY ACCEPTED THIS.

7. SADAT THEN WANTED TO KNOW JUST HOW QUICKLY WE CAN MOVE AHEAD. I RECALLED I HAD TOLD HIM IN OUR LAST MEETING THAT, ONCE IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE TWO POSITIONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE TO ASSURE THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED, YOU ARE PREPARED TO BEGIN ANOTHER SHUTTLE EFFORT. YOU HAD TALKED ABOUT DOING SO TOWARD THE END OF AUGUST WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF FINISHING BEFORE THE UNGA. AGAIN SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES LIKED THIS.

8. FINALLY, I TOLD SADAT THAT WE HAD ARRANGED THAT I MEET YOU IN BELGRADE ON SUNDAY, AUGUST 3, SO THAT I CAN BRIEF YOU IN DETAIL. SADAT SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE INTEREST OF EXPEDITING THINGS, I MEET WITH YOU IN BUCHAREST. I TOLD HIM THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 181005 TOSEC 080220

MAKE FLIGHT ARRANGEMENTS OUT OF CAIRO FOR BUCHAREST. HE THEREUPON
INSTRUCTED VP MOBAREK TO PLACE HIS PRESIDENTIAL MYSTERY AT MY
DISPOSAL TO FLY ME TO BUCHAREST OR BELGRADE, WHICHEVER WE
PREFER. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU WISH ME TO ARRANGE TO MEET
WITH YOU IN BUCHAREST ON SATURDAY, AUGUST 2, INSTEAD OF BELGRADE,
AUGUST 3. IF SO, I SHOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH FAHMY TOMORROW (HE
IS STILL IN ALEXANDRIA) TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENT.
EILTS
UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, CAT-C, CHEROKEE 07/31/75, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 31 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE181005
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: S/S:FVORTIZ
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS-3
Errors: n/a
Film Number: N750003-0083
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197507107/baaaaquk.tel
Line Count: 286
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 08 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <08 APR 2003 by Izenbel0>; APPROVED <17 OCT 2003 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PFOR, EG, US, IS, (SADAT, ANWAR), (FAHMY, ISHMAIL)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006